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We investigate the consequences of demographic change for business cycle analysis. We find that
changes in the age composition of the labor force account for a significant fraction of the variation
in business cycle volatility observed in the U.S. and other G7 economies. During the postwar period,
these countries experienced dramatic demographic change, although details regarding timing and nature
differ from place to place. Using panel-data methods, we exploit this variation to show that the age
composition of the workforce has a large and statistically significant effect on cyclical volatility. We
conclude by relating these findings to the recent decline in U.S. business cycle volatility. Through
simple quantitative accounting exercises, we find that demographic change accounts for approximately














The baby boom and subsequent baby bust in the U.S. resulted in dramatic shifts in the
age composition of the American population. Japan, Germany, and other industrialized
countries have experienced similarly dramatic demographic change during the postwar
period, although the details regarding timing and nature diﬀer from place to place. In
this paper, we investigate the consequences of demographic change for business cycle
analysis.
Recently, a great deal of attention has been devoted to studying the moderation in
business cycle volatility in the U.S since the mid-1980s. However, less attention has been
paid to the run-up in volatility that began in the mid-1960s. We propose demographic
change as a framework that can rationalize the evolution of U.S. macroeconomic volatility
over the last four decades. Moreover, we oﬀer this framework as relevant for understand-
ing the evolution of cyclical volatility observed in other industrialized economies during
the postwar period. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that changes in the age composition of the
workforce account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the variation in business cycle volatility
observed in the U.S. and the rest of the G7.
We establish the relationship between demographics and macroeconomic volatility in
the following manner. First, we document important diﬀerences in the responsiveness of
labor market activity to the business cycle for individuals of diﬀerent ages. In previous
work Clark and Summers (1981), Ríos-Rull (1996), and Gomme et al. (2004) showed,
using postwar U.S. data, that the cyclical volatility of market work is U-shaped as a
function of age. The young experience much greater volatility of employment and hours
worked than the prime-aged over the business cycle; those closer to retirement experience
volatility somewhere in between. Our ﬁrst contribution is to show that this is an empirical
regularity for all G7 countries.
Speciﬁcally, we show in Section 2 that the volatility of market work is U-shaped as
a function of age in these economies. For example, when averaged across countries, the
standard deviation of cyclical employment ﬂuctuations for 15-19 year olds is nearly six
times greater than that of 40-49 year olds; as a result, although teenagers comprise only
6% of aggregate employment, they account for 17% of aggregate employment volatility.
Similarly, the average employment volatility of 60-64 year olds is about three times greater
1than that of 40-49 year olds.
Given this observation, a natural conjecture is that the responsiveness of aggregate
output to business cycle shocks depends on the age composition of the workforce. For
instance, suppose that the volatility of age-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n ti su n a ﬀected by age
composition. Then, when an economy is characterized by a large share of young workers,
all else equal, these should be periods of greater cyclical volatility in market work and
output than would otherwise occur. Our second contribution is to show that this is
indeed the case.
During the postwar period, the G7 countries experienced substantial variation in
business cycle volatility. Variation in the nature of demographic change across countries
allows us to identify the eﬀect of workforce age composition. In Section 3, we use panel-
data methods to show that the age composition has a quantitatively large and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on measures of business cycle volatility. Because workforce composition
is largely determined by fertility decisions made at least 15 years prior to current volatility,
we are able to obtain unbiased inference on the causal eﬀect using standard econometric
techniques.
In Section 4, we relate these ﬁndings to the recent literature on “The Great Moder-
ation” — the decline in macroeconomic volatility experienced in the U.S. since the mid-
1980s.1 Through simple quantitative accounting exercises, we ﬁnd that demographic
change accounts for roughly one-ﬁfth to one-third of the moderation experienced in the
U . S .C l e a r l y ,d e m o g r a p h i cc h a n g ei sn o tt h es o l ef a c t o rr e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h i se p i s o d e ;n e v -
ertheless, demographic change serves as a common factor relevant for understanding the
evolution of business cycle volatility — not only in the U.S., but also in other G7 countries
— over the past four decades.2 We provide concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Diﬀerences in Market Work Volatility by Age
In this section, we analyze the responsiveness of market work to the business cycle for
data disaggregated by age. We begin with an analysis of the U.S. and Japan, countries
1See Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) for early papers identifying
a change in output growth volatility. The term “The Great Moderation” is ﬁrst used to describe this
phenomenon by Stock and Watson (2002), and more recently by Bernanke (2004).
2See also Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003) for analysis of the G7.
2for which consistent information on hours worked by age is available. We then document
diﬀerences in the cyclical volatility of employment by age in the sample of industrialized
economies represented by the G7.
2.1. Evidence on Hours Worked from the U.S. and Japan
Our approach to studying diﬀerences in business cycle volatility by age is similar to that
o fG o m m ee ta l .( 2 0 0 4 ) .W eu s ed a t af r o mt h eM a r c hs u p p l e m e n to ft h eC P St oc o n s t r u c t
annual series of per capita hours worked from 1963 to 2005 for speciﬁc age groups, as
well as an aggregate series for all individuals 15 years and up. For Japan, we construct
age-speciﬁc, annual time series covering 1972 to 2004, using data from the Annual Report
of the Labour Force Survey. See Appendix A for detailed information on data sources
used throughout the paper.
The age-speciﬁc hours worked series display low frequency variation due, for instance,
to changes in female labor force participation and trends in schooling and retirement. As
such, we remove the trend from each series using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. We
follow the recent work of Ravn and Uhlig (2002), who show that the appropriate value
of the smoothing parameter is 6.25 for annual data, when isolating ﬂuctuations at the
traditional business cycle frequencies (those higher than eight years).3
Table 1 presents results for the volatility of hours worked in the U.S. for various age
groups. The ﬁrst row presents the percent standard deviation of the ﬁltered age-speciﬁc
series. We see a distinct U-shaped pattern in the volatility of hours by age.
[TABLE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
We are not interested in the high frequency ﬂuctuations in these time series per
se, but rather those that are correlated with the business cycle. For each age-speciﬁc
series, we identify the business cycle component as the projection on a constant, current
3Using a similar approach, Burnside (2000) arrives at a value of 6.66. Based on visual inspection
of the HP ﬁlter’s transfer function, Baxter and King (1999) recommend a value of 10. Throughout
this paper, we have repeated our analysis of annual data using all of these smoothing parameter values
with the HP ﬁlter, in addition to the band-pass ﬁlter proposed by Baxter and King in order to isolate
ﬂuctuations between 2 and 8 years in frequency. The results are virtually identical in all cases. By
contrast, much of the macroeconomics literature has used a smoothing parameter of 100 with the HP
ﬁlter for annual data. Though not reported here, we have repeated our analysis with this choice, and
the results are very similar. See an earlier draft of this paper, Jaimovich and Siu (2007), for details.
3detrended output, and on current and lagged detrended aggregate hours; we refer to these
as the cyclical hours worked series. The second row of Table 1 reports the R2 from these
regressions. This is very high for most age groups, indicating that the preponderance of
high frequency ﬂuctuations are attributable to the business cycle. The exceptions are
the 60-64 and the 65+ age groups. Here, a larger fraction of ﬂuctuations are due to
age-speciﬁc, non-cyclical shocks.
The third row indicates the percent standard deviation of the cyclical age-speciﬁc se-
ries. Compared to row one, the largest diﬀerences between ﬁltered and cyclical volatilities
are for those aged 60 years and up, reﬂecting the discussion of the previous paragraph.
Nevertheless, the U-shaped pattern remains. The young experience much greater cyclical
volatility in hours than the prime-aged; the volatility of those at retirement age is some-
where in between. Moreover, the diﬀerences across age groups are large. The standard
deviation of cyclical hours ﬂuctuations for 15-19 and 20-24 year old workers is at least
5.5 and 2.5 times that of 50-59 year olds, respectively. Relative to the 50-59 year olds,
hours worked is almost twice as volatile for the 25-29 and 65+ age groups.4
The fourth row indicates the average share of aggregate hours worked during the
sample period by each age group. The last row indicates the share of “aggregate hours
volatility” attributable to each age group. Here, aggregate hours volatility is represented
by the hours-weighted average of age-speciﬁc cyclical volatilities. What is striking is the
extent to which ﬂuctuations in aggregate hours are disproportionately accounted for by
young workers. Although those aged 15-29 make up only 26% of aggregate hours worked,
they account for 44% of aggregate hours volatility. By contrast, prime-aged workers in
their 40s and 50s account for 41% of hours but only 27% of hours volatility.
These large diﬀerences by age remain when we undertake further demographic break-
downs. These results are presented in Appendix B and summarized here. We ﬁrst disag-
gregate the U.S. workforce by age and educational attainment. For brevity, we present
results only for two education groups: those with high school diplomas or less (labeled
less education), and those with at least some postsecondary education (more education).
4These results corroborate the ﬁndings of Gomme et al. (2004), and extend them to include data from
the 2001 recession. See also Clark and Summers (1981), Moser (1986), Rios-Rull (1996), and Nagypál
(2004) who document diﬀerences in cyclical sensitivity across age groups. More broadly, the literature
documents diﬀerences as a function of skill; see for instance, Kydland and Prescott (1993) and Hoynes
(2000), and the references therein. Note that those studies are conﬁned to the analysis of U.S. data.
4Several observations deserve mention.
First, there is a noticeable diﬀerence in the volatility of hours by education. Inter-
estingly, the diﬀerences across education are much less pronounced for young workers
than for the prime-aged. A simple average across 20-24 and 25-29 year olds indicates
that those with less education have hours volatility that is 1.5 times that of those with
more; by contrast, the diﬀerence across education groups is a factor of 2.5 for those aged
30-59. Note that large diﬀerences by age remain for both education groups. For instance,
20-24 year olds experience hours volatility 2.5 to 3 times greater than 40-49 year olds,
regardless of educational attainment. Indeed, 20-29 year olds with more education have
greater volatility than prime-age workers with less education.
Appendix B also presents results disaggregated by age and gender. Again, the U-
shaped pattern exists for both men and women. Moreover, the magnitude of volatility
diﬀerences by age is roughly similar. Importantly, the diﬀerences across age groups within
gender are much more pronounced than the diﬀerences across genders within age groups.
An average across age groups indicates that males have 10% higher hours volatility over
the cycle. On the other hand, 15-19 and 20-24 year olds experience hours ﬂuctuations that
are roughly 5.5 and 3 times more volatile than 50-59 year olds, for either gender. Gomme
et al. (2004) discuss age diﬀerences with further demographic breakdowns (e.g., marital
status, industry of occupation) for the U.S. Their results corroborate those presented
here, indicating large and important diﬀerences in the volatility of hours worked by age.
Table 2 presents the same calculations as shown in Table 1 for Japan. As in the U.S.,
t h e r ei saU - s h a p e dp a t t e r nt ob o t ht h eﬁltered and the cyclical volatility of hours as a
function of age. Several diﬀerences between the two countries deserve mention.
[TABLE 2 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
First, the volatility of hours worked is smaller in Japan overall. Second, the regression
R2s for those aged 60+ are larger in Japan than in the U.S., indicating that hours ﬂuctu-
ations for these workers are more correlated with the business cycle. Third, the volatility
of teenagers and those aged 65+ relative to the prime-aged is very similar to that found
in the U.S. For the remaining age groups, the diﬀerences are not as pronounced, although
signiﬁcant diﬀerences by age remain. Finally, individuals over the age of 60 in Japan are
more signiﬁcant contributors to the volatility of aggregate hours than those in the U.S.
5This is due to their larger hours share and their greater age-speciﬁc cyclical volatility. In
fact, except for teenagers, the 65+ group experiences greater cyclical volatility in hours
worked than any other age group.
2.2. Evidence on Employment from the G7
We provide further evidence of the diﬀerences across age groups in business cycle volatility
b yc o n s i d e r i n gd a t af o rt h eG 7e c o n o m i e s .B e cause hours worked data disaggregated by
age are not available for all countries, we restrict our attention to employment. The data
we analyze are from published and unpublished national government sources, and the
OECD Labour Force Statistics database. The data are at an annual frequency, and the
time coverage varies across countries. See Appendix A for details.
We identify cyclical ﬂuctuations in the data as we did in our analysis of hours worked.
For many of the G7 countries, the high frequency ﬂuctuations of those aged 65 and
older are largely orthogonal to the business cycle. For instance, from the regression of
employment of the 65+ age group on aggregate employment and output, the R2 for
France is only 0.04. In Italy, employment for this group is actually negatively correlated
with the cycle. As a result, for all countries except Japan, we omit those aged 65 years
and up, and deﬁne aggregate employment as that among 15-to-64 year olds.5 We retain
this older group for Japan since their age-speciﬁc employment regression produces an R2
of 0.67, indicating that employment among the old is highly correlated with the cycle.
[TABLE 3 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
Table 3 presents our results for HP-ﬁltered data from the G7. For brevity, the in-
formation displayed is condensed relative to Tables 1 and 2. Because postwar aggregate
employment volatility varies widely across countries, we normalize the age-speciﬁcm e a -
sures relative to the volatility of 40-49 year olds.
Again, the age proﬁle of business cycle employment volatility can be characterized as
roughly U-shaped, with large diﬀerences across age groups.6 The young and old display
greater cyclical sensitivity than prime-aged individuals. In all countries, the 15-29 year
5Since the 65+ share of the labor force and employment is small, our results are unchanged if we
include this group in our analysis.
6See Gomme et al. (2004) for similar results for several OECD countries.
6olds are substantially more volatile than those aged 30-59. This is particularly true for
the continental European countries. Taking a simple average across all G7 countries,
we ﬁnd that while the young comprise 30% of aggregate employment, they account for
approximately 50% of aggregate employment volatility. Large diﬀerences between the
prime-aged and those over 60 are also evident in Europe and Japan. In each of these
countries, this older group also contributes disproportionately to aggregate volatility.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that age-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in business cycle responsiveness of
market work are an empirical regularity in our sample of industrialized economies. Our
ﬁndings extend the results of Clark and Summers (1981), Ríos-Rull (1996), and Gomme
et al. (2004) for the U.S. to the rest of the G7. That these economies diﬀer greatly
in terms of industry composition and the degree of labor market regulation makes this
ﬁnding all the more striking. These results suggest that the age composition of the labor
force is potentially a key determinant of the responsiveness of an economy to business
cycle shocks. In the next section, we conﬁrm this conjecture.
3. Age Composition and Business Cycle Volatility
We employ panel-data methods to study the relationship between cyclical volatility and
demographics in the G7. Our identiﬁcation comes from cross-country diﬀerences in the
extent and timing of demographic changes. As a rough summary of these changes, Figure
1, Panel A presents birth rates for three of the G7 countries.
In the U.S. and Canada, the postwar baby boom led to an unusually large cohort
of “20-something” labor market entrants in the mid- to late-1970s, and subsequently a
large cohort of prime-aged workforce participants beginning around 1990. In France,
Italy, and Germany, the baby boom was less pronounced, and demographic change has
been less dramatic. Instead, declining fertility (which accelerated in the late-1960s) has
resulted in an aging of the labor force. The demographic experience of the U.K. falls
somewhere in between those of North America and continental Europe, so the changes
in age composition there are intermediate to those just described. In Japan, a sharp
decline in fertility occurred after WWII, leading to a marked drop in the number of
young workers entering the labor force since the early-1970s. In addition, population
aging has led to an increasing share of workforce participants over the age of 60; this has
7been particularly pronounced since 1980.
Figure 1, Panel B depicts the share of the labor force composed of individuals aged
15-29 years old for the same three countries as in Panel A. Comparing these panels, it is
clear that the primary factor driving changes in labor force composition since WWII is
changes in fertility.
We use this variation in demographic change to determine the impact of workforce
age composition on business cycle volatility. The obvious related question is how changes
in the age distribution aﬀect speciﬁc countries. Given the extensive literature on the
moderation of U.S. business cycles experienced over the past 25 years, and the relevance
of our results to this issue, we defer that discussion to Section 4.
Our baseline measure for the age distribution is the share of the labor force by various
age groups.7 We examine labor force shares since this reﬂects our interest in the role of
diﬀerential market work volatility by age in aﬀecting macroeconomic volatility. We are
able to interpret our empirical results as causal, insofar as labor force shares are exogenous
to the determinants of business cycle volatility. The close correlation between Panels A
and B of Figure 1 indicates that the low frequency movements in workforce shares are
driven by movements in population age composition. Since population composition is
determined largely by fertility decisions made at least 15 years earlier, this component
of labor force shares is exogenous to current business cycle conditions. This leaves the
potential endogeneity of age-speciﬁc labor force participation rates and international
migration to cyclical volatility unaccounted for. We consider two formal approaches to
address these issues below.
To measure cyclical volatility or, more abstractly, an economy’s responsiveness to
business cycle shocks at a point-in-time, we use two approaches pursued in the literature.
Our ﬁrst approach measures cyclical volatility at quarter t as the standard deviation
of ﬁltered real GDP during a 41-quarter (10-year) window centered around quarter t.
We adopt the HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600 as our benchmark, and consider
measures constructed with other ﬁlters and time windows to demonstrate robustness.
7See Appendix A for data sources. Because of limitations in data availability, our time coverage
diﬀers from country to country, so our sample represents an unbalanced panel. Annual observations
for labor force shares are available from national labor force surveys, and were obtained from various
published and unpublished sources.
8Our second measure of cyclical volatility is the instantaneous standard deviation of 4-
quarter real GDP growth considered by Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), hereafter SW.
This measure is estimated from a stochastic volatility model for output growth with
time-varying autoregressive parameters; for brevity, we do not present the time series
model or estimation method here, and refer readers to SW for details.8
The benchmark regression we consider is:
σit = αi + βt + γshareit + εit, (3.1)
where σit is the particular measure of business cycle volatility for country i at year t,a n d
shareit is the particular (vector of) labor force share measure(s) under consideration.
We account for unobserved heterogeneity in volatility via the country ﬁxed eﬀect, αi.
We include a full set of time dummies, βt, which allows us to control for time-varying
factors aﬀecting volatility that are common across countries. This also implies that our
identiﬁcation of γ is through age composition change that is not shared across countries
over time.9
We are interested in this regression for the following reason. The estimated value
of γ is informative with respect to the average eﬀect of labor force shares on output
volatility. However, it does not identify the speciﬁc economic mechanisms generating
this relationship. For instance, changes in age composition can aﬀect the volatility of
market work (and thus, the volatility of output) in two ways. First, changes in the
age structure have a direct composition eﬀect, changing the relative shares of stable
(prime-aged) and volatile (young and old) workers in the aggregate. Second, changes
in the age structure can have a more indirect eﬀect, changing the volatility of hours
and employment of speciﬁc age groups. Our benchmark regression does not identify
the relative contributions of such direct and indirect eﬀects, but identiﬁes the sign and
magnitude of the total eﬀect. We return to this discussion in Section 4.
8Quarterly real GDP is used to construct the cyclical volatility measures; annual time series were con-
structed by averaging over quarters. Essentially identical results obtain when we annualize by selecting
the value for the second quarter of each year.
9See Blanchard and Simon (2001) for a similar empirical speciﬁcation, studying the relationship
between inﬂation and output volatility.
93.1. A First Cut
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation we consider is one where share is the fraction of the 15-64 year old
labor force accounted for by 15-29 year olds plus 60-64 year olds. Given the U-shaped
pattern in market work volatility as a function of age documented in Section 2, we refer
to this measure as the volatile-aged labor force share. We view this speciﬁcation as a
simple and informative “ﬁr s tc u t ”t oi l l u s t r a t et h ea v e r a g ee ﬀe c to ft h ea g ed i s t r i b u t i o n
on business cycle volatility in the G7. We discuss the robustness of our results to alter-
native deﬁnitions of the volatile-aged below, and we present results using a more detailed
treatment of the age distribution in the following subsection.
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, Panels A and B of Figure 2 present time
series for cyclical volatility, σi (depicted by the light lines), and the volatile-aged labor
force share, sharei (the dark line), for the U.S. and Japan. The solid light line is our
benchmark “rolling window” measure of business cycle volatility; by construction, this
uses HP-ﬁltered output data from 1958 to 2004. The dashed light line is the SW measure.
Both measures depict very similar pictures for the postwar evolution of cyclical volatility.
Moreover, the volatility series and the volatile-aged labor force share track each other
very closely in both countries. In the U.S., output volatility rose from the early 1960s
to the late 1970s, then fell to present. This pattern is matched by the labor force share
of the young. The hump in the labor force share that peaks around 1976 is due to the
entrance of baby boomers into the workforce.
However, this correlation could be spurious, because of such factors as instability
of oil prices and monetary policy in the 1970s. In this respect, a cross-country analy-
sis disciplines our inference: in our panel regression, the eﬀect of labor force shares is
identiﬁed through diﬀerences in demographic change across countries. Consider Japan,
which similarly experienced postwar moderation in output volatility and aging of the
workforce, but with quite a diﬀerent evolution. In contrast to the U.S., Japan’s business
cycle volatility fell beginning around 1970, accelerating in the late 1970s. After stabiliz-
ing in the early 1980s, volatility has since risen. Again, this pattern is closely tracked by
Japan’s volatile-aged labor force share. The fact that these changes in demographics and
volatility represent a “mirror image” of the U.S. strongly suggests that the correlation is
not spurious.
10The remaining panels of Figures 2 and 3 present the same series for all G7 countries.
In each panel, the scale of the vertical axes is identical to facilitate comparison. In six
of the seven countries, business cycle volatility and the volatile labor force share clearly
covary, although there is a slight phase shift in Canada. In France, unconditional evidence
of this relationship is weaker, but relative to the other countries there is little change in
volatility to explain.
Table 4 presents estimation results from equation (3.1) on γ,t h ea v e r a g ee ﬀect of
the labor force measure on business cycle volatility. Column 1 presents our OLS esti-
mate when σit is the “rolling window” measure of the standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered
output. The regression result suﬀers from autocorrelated residuals. This is due in part
to the construction of the volatility measure, which results in overlap of output data in
consecutive observations of σit.T oa d d r e s st h i s ,w er u ns t a n dard tests on the residuals to
determine the highest order of serial correlation. For this speciﬁcation, we cannot reject
a highest order of two. In Column 1 and throughout the paper, we report results when
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are constructed using the
Newey-West estimator in this manner.
[TABLE 4 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
The share of volatile-aged workforce participants has a positive eﬀect on business
cycle volatility. To interpret the magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimate, a 10% increase in
this labor force share would increase cyclical volatility by 0.40.10 W ee s t i m a t et h i se ﬀect
to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
To illustrate robustness, Table 4 reports coeﬃcient estimates when we change the
measurement of cyclical volatility. In Column 2, we consider real output detrended by
ﬁrst-diﬀerencing; relative to the HP ﬁlter, this ampliﬁes high frequency ﬂuctuations.
This is the detrending method considered by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) in their studies of the Great Moderation. In Column 3, we consider
the 4-quarter growth rate of real output, which is the detrending method used by SW.
Next, we take the frequencies that the HP ﬁlter passes (those higher than 32 quarters),
and split them approximately in two: we isolate ﬂuctuations with frequency between 2
10Again, we delay discussion of this in relation to the U.S. Great Moderation to the following section.
11and 16 quarters and those between 17 and 32 quarters, using the band pass (BP) ﬁlter
proposed by Baxter and King (1999). These results are presented in Columns 4 and 5,
respectively. The estimated eﬀect of the volatile-aged labor force share on all measures
is positive and signiﬁcant at either the 5% or 1% level. For brevity, we report only the
results for the 41-quarter window; the results using the 21-quarter window are virtually
identical (see an earlier draft of this paper, Jaimovich and Siu, 2007, for details). Finally,
note that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimates cannot be compared across columns
since the deﬁnition of the dependent variable diﬀers.
As a further experiment, we broaden our investigation by considering output ﬂuctu-
ations outside of the traditionally deﬁned business cycle frequency. Speciﬁcally, Comin
and Gertler (2006) introduce the concept of the “medium-term business cycle” to de-
scribe sustained swings across periods of growth and stagnation, in addition to the more
commonly considered booms and recessions of shorter duration. Looking at the medium-
term allows us to include ﬂuctuations associated with the U.S. productivity slowdown
and the onset of the Japanese stagnation in the 1990s, for example, in our measure of
volatility. To do so, we follow Comin and Gertler and isolate output ﬂuctuations with
frequency between 2 and 200 quarters using the BP ﬁlter.11 Column 7 presents the esti-
mation result when, again, volatility is measured with a 41-quarter rolling window. We
ﬁnd that the volatile-aged labor force share has a positive eﬀect on medium-term cyclical
volatility; however, the p-value on the estimate is 0.13, so that it falls just outside the
usual range for statistical signiﬁcance. We conclude that while there is evidence for an
eﬀect of demographics on medium-term volatility, it is stronger at conventional business
cycle frequencies.
Finally, in Column 7, we report the estimation result when σit is SW’s measure of
the instantaneous standard deviation of 4-quarter real GDP growth. Again, the share of
volatile-aged workforce participants has a positive eﬀect on business cycle volatility, and
the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
11We implement this using the BP ﬁlter proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). See Christiano
and Fitzgerald for a discussion of the merits of their method for isolating ﬂuctuations outside of the
traditional business cycle frequencies relative to Baxter and King (1999).
123.2. Further Robustness Results
The results in Table 3.1 are potentially subject to endogeneity problems because any
group’s labor force share depends on its participation rate, which in turn may depend
on (country-speciﬁc) shocks determining output volatility. Endogeneity bias results if
the response of labor force participation to these shocks diﬀe r sa c r o s sa g eg r o u p s . T o
investigate this, we present instrumental variables (IV) results in which each country’s
volatile-aged labor force share is instrumented by its population share of 15-29 and 60-64
year olds.
The ﬁrst column in Table 5 repeats our benchmark OLS result from Table 4. Panel
A considers the rolling window measure of volatility using HP-ﬁltered output. Column
2 presents our estimate when workforce shares are instrumented by population shares.
Again, the eﬀect of the volatile group’s labor force share is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient changes little from our OLS result. Using
the Hausman test, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity bias in our original
labor force measure.
[TABLE 5 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
Our second IV approach goes further, addressing the possibility that the population
age distribution is endogenous as well. This would occur if the response of international
migration to shocks determining output volatility diﬀered across age groups. To address
this, we instrument the labor force share by lagged birth rates. The motivation for
this is straightforward. Excluding migration, an age group’s share of the 15-64 year old
population is determined by the distribution of births 15 to 64 years prior.12 Since past
fertility is almost certainly exogenous to current macroeconomic volatility, instrumenting
by lagged birth rates allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal impact of labor
force composition.
We instrument by projecting the volatile-aged labor force share on 20-year, 30-year,
40-year, 50-year, and 60-year lagged birth rates. The results are presented in Column 3
of Table 5. Again, the estimated eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimate is similar to the original OLS result.
12This ignores deaths among individuals under age 64, which is statistically negligible in G7 countries.
13Using population shares and lagged birth rates as instruments is problematic, though,
if demographics aﬀect cyclical volatility, independent of their inﬂuence on labor force
composition. This is possible if, for example, diﬀerential demand for investment and
durable goods or diﬀerential impacts of borrowing constraints across age groups have
important business cycle eﬀects. In this case, population measures may not constitute
valid instruments for labor force shares.13
Given this, we consider an alternative approach to addressing the potential endogene-
ity of labor force measures: we simply remove the medium and high frequency variation
in the volatile-aged labor force share. Using the BP ﬁlter, we discard all ﬂuctuations at
frequencies greater than 20 years. This corresponds to the view that endogeneity arises
from unobserved shocks, simultaneously determining labor force shares and business cy-
cle volatility. In this case, it should suﬃce to restrict our attention only to low frequency
movements in workforce composition that are orthogonal to cyclical volatility shocks.
Column 4 reports the result of this exercise. Again, the coeﬃcient estimate is positive
and signiﬁcant, and is very similar to our benchmark result.
In Panel B of Table 5, we repeat the preceding analysis, this time using the instanta-
neous volatility measure of SW as the dependent variable in equation (3.1). The eﬀect
of the volatile-aged labor force share is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at either the
5% or 1% level in all cases, and again, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity
bias in our original labor force measure.
As a further robustness check, we add to our benchmark empirical speciﬁcation the
regressors considered by Blanchard and Simon (2001). Blanchard and Simon conclude
that inﬂation volatility displays a strong, and potentially causal, relationship with output
volatility. This conclusion is based on panel-data analysis similar to ours, in which
output volatility is regressed on the mean and standard deviation of inﬂation, along with
country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The inﬂation volatility coeﬃc i e n ti sf o u n dt ob el a r g ea n d
statistically signiﬁcant.
As Blanchard and Simon acknowledge, concern arises from the endogeneity of inﬂation
13Indeed, inference on any hypothesis regarding the causal role of demographics on volatility will rely
on exogenous variation in population measures. As a result, it is very diﬃcult to provide direct evidence
to exclude such alternative hypotheses. However, the results of the following subsection provide strong
evidence for the labor market composition eﬀects we emphasize.
14measures and output volatility. This bias makes inference problematic. Consequently,
when we include inﬂation measures in our analysis, we do not view the magnitude of the
coeﬃcient estimates as particularly informative. The point is simply to illustrate that
our results are robust to concerns of spurious correlation between labor force composition
and output volatility. The OLS estimate from this exercise is reported in Column 5 of
Table 5; Column 6 reports the estimate when the labor force measure is instrumented
by lagged birth rates. Including the inﬂation measures does not alter the sign or the
statistical signiﬁcance of the original ﬁndings (the results for the IV1 and BP exercises
are virtually identical).
Our last experiment concerns the “spacing” or temporal frequency of observations.
The demographic change underlying our inference is a gradual process. Consequently,
perhaps meaningful variation in our labor force measure obtains only at longer time
horizons. This concern is addressed in Panels C and D, where we repeat our analysis of
Panels A and B, this time with annual observations spaced four years apart.14 Panel C
reports results when we use the rolling window measure of cyclical volatility, and Panel
D when we use the SW measure. Note that this change does not substantively aﬀect our
results, strengthening our conclusion of a positive link between the volatile group’s labor
force share and output volatility.
Finally, we consider alternative deﬁnitions of the volatile-aged labor force share guided
by our results in Section 2. In the U.S., despite the fact that 60-64 year olds display
greater volatility than the prime-aged, their contribution to total hours worked volatility
is smaller than their contribution to total hours worked. The same is true in Canada, in
terms of employment. As such, we redeﬁne the volatile-aged in these countries as only
15-29 year olds. Also, the results in Section 2 indicate that, unlike in other countries, in
Japan the 65+ year olds are signiﬁcant contributors to the volatility of aggregate hours
and employment. Therefore, we redeﬁne sharei for Japan as the fraction of the 15+
workforce accounted for by 15-29 and 60+ year olds. Considering these changes, both
separately and simultaneously, does not change any of the results reported in Tables 4
and 5. Taken together, we interpret the results of this subsection as convincing evidence
14We choose this relative to a more conventional 5-year spacing for practical reasons: given the unbal-
anced nature of our panel, this one-year drop in frequency results in a disproportionately large drop in
the number of observations.
15of a positive eﬀect of the labor force share of volatile aged individuals on business cycle
volatility.
3.3. Looking at the Entire Age Distribution
Up to this point the results indicate that periods with a larger share of age groups
with cyclically sensitive market work tend to display greater business cycle volatility. In
this section, we extend our analysis to include a more detailed look at the eﬀect of the
workforce age composition.
In particular, we use the entire age distribution of the labor force as the regressor in
(3.1). This is motivated by our results in Section 2: namely, there is a U-shaped pattern
in the cyclical volatility of hours and employment as a function of age. Our intent is to
determine whether there is a similar U-shaped eﬀect of age shares on aggregate output
volatility. This would support our view that the shape of the entire age distribution
aﬀects the responsiveness of an economy to business cycle shocks, and that the crucial
channel of inﬂuence is via diﬀerences in the cyclical sensitivity of market work across age
groups.
We alter our empirical speciﬁcation so that the regressor, share, is a vector of labor
force shares: the shares of the 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64 year old age groups. Because
shares sum to one, we exclude the 15-29 year olds for the obvious reason. This means
that the coeﬃcient on any particular age group represents the change in cyclical volatility
that results from a shift of workforce share out of the 15-29 group, into that age group.
[TABLE 6 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
Table 6 presents results when the dependent variable is our benchmark rolling window
measure for HP-ﬁltered output. Row 1 presents the OLS estimate. We include a column
of zeros for the 15-29 year olds to reiterate the interpretation of coeﬃcient estimates laid
out in the previous paragraph. Relative to our conjecture, the estimated coeﬃcients have
the expected sign and magnitude. A decrease in the share of 15-29 year olds in favor of
any other age group reduces business cycle volatility. Moreover, the eﬀect is U-shaped as a
function of age. The smallest reduction in volatility comes from shifting young workforce
members into the 60-64 age group, although this eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
16zero. This is consistent with our results in Section 2, indicating that both the young and
the old tend to contribute disproportionately to aggregate employment volatility in the
G7. By contrast, shifting the labor force out of the young and into prime-aged groups
results in large and statistically signiﬁcant reductions in cyclical volatility. Again, this is
consistent with the U-shape in market work volatility.
We conduct additional experiments by varying the excluded age group, one at a time,
from the regression. This allows us to determine the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences across
age-group pairs. For brevity we do not report these results, but summarize them as
follows: broadly speaking, the biggest diﬀerences in volatility eﬀects are between either
the 15-29 or 60-64 age groups (Set 1) and either the 40-49 or 50-59 age groups (Set 2).
Across Set 1 and Set 2, the diﬀerence in coeﬃcient estimates for any pair of age groups
is large and statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, for pairs within Sets 1 and
2, the estimated diﬀerence is small and insigniﬁcant. The 30-39 year olds represent an
intermediate group. When this group is excluded, the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% and 10% levels for the 50-59s and 15-29s, respectively, and is insigniﬁcant for
the 40-49s and 60-64s.15
In the remaining rows of Table 6 we report robustness checks that address the poten-
tial endogeneity of labor force shares. In Row 2 we present IV estimates using population
shares as instruments; in Row 3 we present IV estimates using lagged birth rates (see the
previous subsection for details). The results are hardly changed relative to Row 1. Row
4 presents the results when we BP ﬁlter the workforce shares to retain only ﬂuctuations
with periodicity greater than 20 years, as described in the previous subsection. Again,
the eﬀect on business cycle volatility is U-shaped as a function of age.
[TABLE 7 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
Table 7 presents the same regression estimates as Table 6, but using SW’s instanta-
neous volatility measure. Again, a decrease in the share of 15-29 year olds in favor of any
other age group reduces cyclical volatility. The largest eﬀect comes from shifting young
15Though the results are not reported here, we also experiment using diﬀerent splits in age groups to
ensure robustness. For instance, we split the young into two groups, those aged 15-24 and those aged
25-29. This has minimal impact on the results. Again, we obtain a U-shaped impact of workforce age
shares on cyclical volatility. In fact, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the estimated eﬀect of
15-24 and 25-29 year olds. Other splits yield similar results, and maintain the U-shaped pattern.
17workforce members into the 40-49 age group, where the reduction is estimated to be
signiﬁcant at either the 5% or 1% level. As in Table 6, shifting the labor force out of the
young and into the 60-64 age group does not result in a statistically signiﬁcant volatility
reduction. As such, the eﬀect can again be characterized as U-shaped as a function of
age.
To determine robustness, we repeat our analysis of the workforce age distribution by
using observations spaced 4 years apart. Though not reported here, we ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant age group eﬀects and a U-shaped pattern in coeﬃcient estimates as a function
of age (see Jaimovich and Siu, 2007, for details). Finally, we include measures of average
inﬂation and inﬂation volatility in our analysis. Again, our results regarding the sign and
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates are unchanged.
Given the U-shaped pattern documented in Section 2, we view this as compelling
evidence that the inﬂuence of demographic composition on volatility operates through
diﬀerences in the cyclical sensitivity of hours and employment across age groups. The
pattern of market work volatility as a function of age represents a natural explanation
for the U-shaped impact of age shares on business cycle volatility. Indeed, any other
hypothesis regarding the impact of demographic composition on output volatility would
need to rationalize this pattern.
3.4. A Joint Estimation Procedure
As a ﬁnal exercise, we pursue an approach that allows us to jointly obtain estimates of
time-varying business cycle volatility and the role of the workforce age distribution in its
determination. As a by-product, this allows us to avoid issues such as those associated
with serial correlation of residuals in (3.1) from the use of rolling windows in measuring
volatility.
Speciﬁcally, we follow the methodology of Ramey and Ramey (1995), who used a sim-
ilar approach to analyze the eﬀect of government spending induced volatility on growth.16
For our purposes, we consider the following empirical framework linking demographics
to the volatility of real output growth:
∆yit = μi + υit, (3.2)







,σ it = αi + βt + γshareit. (3.3)
Here, ∆yit is output growth for country i in period t, μi is mean growth in country i, σit
is the time-varying standard deviation of the residual υit,a n dshareit is the labor force
age composition measure under consideration. We estimate the system (3.2)-(3.3) using
full information maximum likelihood.
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Table 8 presents the results from this estimation procedure. Column 1 presents the
coeﬃcient estimate of γ when share is the volatile-aged labor force share. The coeﬃcient
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The remaining columns present
the results when the regressor is the vector of 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64 year old
labor force shares. Again, we obtain statistically signiﬁcant reductions in output growth
volatility by shifting workforce share out of the young and into the prime-age groups. As
before, shifting the labor force out of the 15-29 year olds and into the 60-64 year olds
does not result in a statistically signiﬁcant volatility reduction.
To summarize, we ﬁnd convincing evidence that the workforce age composition is a key
determinant of an economy’s responsiveness to business cycle shocks. Estimation results
from our benchmark speciﬁcation, (3.1), and the system, (3.2)-(3.3), indicate that there
is a large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the labor force age distribution on cyclical
volatility. Moreover, the largest eﬀect comes from shifting the workforce across young
and prime-aged demographic groups, those with the largest diﬀerence in the volatility of
hours and employment over the business cycle.
4. The Great Moderation: Quantitative Accounting
Since the mid-1980s the U.S. has undergone a substantial decline in business cycle volatil-
ity, as shown in Figure 2, Panel A. Indeed, determining the causes of “The Great Mod-
eration” is the objective of a growing body of literature. Potential explanations include
ar e d u c t i o ni ni n ﬂation volatility that is potentially related to improved monetary policy
(see, for instance, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000; Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock
and Watson, 2002); regulatory changes and ﬁnancial market innovation related to house-
hold borrowing (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2006; Fisher and Gervais, 2006; Justiniano
19and Primiceri, 2006), changes that have reduced the volatility of production relative to
sales (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Ramey and Vine, 2006); and good luck, in the
form of a reduction in the variance of business cycle shocks (Stock and Watson, 2002 and
2003; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006; Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian, 2006).
In this section, we take a ﬁrst step at quantifying the role of demographic change
in accounting for the Great Moderation. In other work, we consider a quantitative
theoretical approach which takes a speciﬁc stance on the impulses generating cyclical
ﬂuctuations and the eﬀect of demographic change on the propagation of shocks (see
Jaimovich, Pruitt, and Siu, 2008). We view the simple accounting exercises conducted
here as suggestive of the magnitude in change owing to demographic considerations, and
indicative of the need to pursue careful quantitative analysis.
Our ﬁrst exercise simply involves interpreting the coeﬃcient estimates from our G7
panel regression, (3.1). Consider ﬁrst the standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered output calcu-
lated over a rolling 10-year time window; this is plotted as the light, solid line in Figure
2, Panel A. According to this measure, U.S. business cycle volatility peaks in 1978. This
year corresponds with a 15-29 year old labor force share of 39.7%. Volatility then falls
during the 1980s, coinciding with an aging of the workforce as baby boomers enter their
prime-aged years. By 1999, the 15-29 year old share is only 27.9%, representing a level
reduction of 11.8% from 1978.
From our OLS estimates in Table 6, it follows that such a shift in workforce composi-
tion — from the 15-29 age group into the 40-49 age group — predicts a volatility reduction
of 0.118×4.058 = 0.479. Given that our measure of cyclical volatility falls from 2.379 to
0.955 between 1978 and 1999, this change in age composition accounts for roughly 34%
of the moderation between these two dates.
T h el i g h t ,d a s h e dl i n ei nF i g u r e2d e p i c t sS tock and Watson’s (2002, 2003) instanta-
neous standard deviation of output growth. This volatility measure peaks in 1981 before
falling during the mid-1980s. Performing the same exercise as above, we ﬁnd that the
change in workforce age composition accounts for roughly 35% of the moderation in this
measure.
Finally, we present a simple decomposition exercise to determine how much of the
change in aggregate market work volatility is attributable to the change in the age distri-
20bution of the workforce. We use the data analyzed in Section 2 and compare the volatility
of HP-ﬁltered measures across 1967 - 1984 and 1985 - 2004.
The standard deviation of per capita aggregate employment ﬂuctuations falls 62.2
log points across the two periods. To isolate the eﬀect due purely to the change in
composition, we construct a counterfactual series for per capita aggregate employment,
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Doing this for every year, 1967 - 2004, generates a counterfactual time series {ˆ e
pre
t }.
We compare the standard deviation of ﬁltered counterfactual employment across the
pre- and post-moderation periods. Had the age composition stayed constant at the
average pre-moderation level, the standard deviation would have fallen by only 47.2 log
points. That is, the change in age composition explains (62.2 − 47.2) ÷ 62.2 or 24% of
the moderation in aggregate employment volatility. Performing the same experiment for
hours worked, we ﬁnd that 20% o fi t sm o d e r a t i o ni sd u et od e m o g r a p h i cc h a n g e .
Is this decomposition exercise informative? Note that the experiment assumes that
the volatility of age-speciﬁc market work is independent of the age composition. That is,
it assumes the absence of indirect eﬀects of changing age structure on aggregate volatility
via changes in the volatility of age-speciﬁc employment and hours worked.
To determine whether this is reasonable, we test for the presence of such eﬀects using
cross-country regression analysis similar to that considered in Section 3. For example, we
regress the volatility of employment of 15-29 year olds on the 15-29 year old labor force
share, controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects and factors aﬀecting business cycle volatility
21common across countries. We ﬁnd that a 10% increase in the share of 15-29 year olds
decreases the standard deviation of their employment by 0.0007%; this is not estimated
to be diﬀerent from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels. For brevity, we do not report
results for other age groups since, again, the eﬀects are estimated to be small in magnitude
and statistically insigniﬁcant. Hence, we ﬁnd no strong evidence for these indirect eﬀects
in the G7 sample.
To get a sense of the importance of the age composition eﬀect, we performed the
same decomposition for other demographic factors. As discussed in Section 2, diﬀerences
exist in the cyclical volatility of hours worked for those with high-school diplomas or less,
relative to those with at least some post-secondary education. Running a counterfactual
where we hold the education composition ﬁxed at the average 1967 - 1984 level, we ﬁnd
that rising educational attainment in the U.S. accounts for roughly 10% of the observed
reduction in aggregate hours volatility. This compares to the value of 20% above from
holding the age composition ﬁxed, and a value of 29% when we simultaneously hold the
age-and-education composition ﬁxed.
Likewise, we considered experiments on the gender composition of the workforce.
Holding the male-female shares constant at the pre-moderation levels resulted in essen-
tially no change in the volatility of aggregate hours. Similarly, holding the gender-and-age
or gender-age-and-education composition constant produced negligible diﬀerences from
simply holding the age or age-and-education composition ﬁxed, as reported in the previ-
ous paragraph.
As a result, we ﬁnd age composition change as the single most important demographic
factor in the reduction of market work volatility. Moreover, because this demographic
change was driven by the baby boom of the 1950s, it is much easier to establish exogene-
ity with respect to the moderation of the 1980s. This is in contrast to the compositional
changes due to trends in post-secondary enrollment and female labor force participa-
tion decisions. Finally, the hump-shaped change induced by the baby boom generates
a relationsip with both the run-up in volatility of the late-1960s and the recent moder-
ation. The steady trends in educational attainment and labor force participation have
less predictive power with respect to the non-monotonic change observed in the U.S.
To conclude, note that the results of the decomposition exercise on aggregate market
22work volatility are similar in magnitude to the role of age composition change in the
moderation of output volatility derived from our panel regression analysis. We take this
as evidence for an important role for demographics in explaining the Great Moderation.
5. Conclusion
Recent work has documented the empirical implications of demographic change for
macroeconomic analysis.17 In this paper, we investigate the consequences of demographic
change for business cycle analysis. We ﬁnd that changes in the age composition of the
labor force account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the variation in postwar business cycle
volatility in G7 economies.
Our identiﬁcation comes from variation in the nature and timing of demographic
change experienced across countries during the postwar period. Using panel data meth-
ods, we show that the age composition of the workforce has a quantitatively large and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on cyclical volatility. Moreover, the estimated eﬀect is found
to be U-shaped as a function of age. We supplement this by documenting a U-shaped
pattern in the cyclical volatility of employment and hours worked across age groups in
the same sample of countries. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the channel
of inﬂuence of demographic composition on business cycle volatility operates through
diﬀerences in the sensitivity of market work across age groups. Finally, through a series
of quantitative accounting exercises, we ﬁnd that age composition change accounts for
roughly one-ﬁfth to one-third of the moderation in cyclical volatility experienced in the
U.S.
These results indicate that the demographic composition of an economy’s workforce
constitutes a potentially important propagation mechanism in business cycle analysis. As
such, there are strong returns to a theoretical understanding for why diﬀerences in cycli-
cal volatility of market work exist across age groups, and how variation in the workforce
age composition manifests itself in variation of macroeconomic volatility.18 In Jaimovich,
Pruitt, and Siu (2008), we address these issues within the context of a quantitative macro-
17See, for instance, Shimer (1998) and Abraham and Shimer (2002) who study the impact of the aging
of the baby boom population on U.S. unemployment, and Feyrer (2007) on the relationship between
workforce age composition and productivity growth.
18Indeed, an interesting question is whether such an explanation can also address the results of Shimer
(1998) and Abraham and Shimer (2002) regarding demographic composition and average unemployment.
23economic model featuring capital-experience complementarity in production. We show
that the model is capable of matching observed diﬀerences in the cyclicality of both hours
worked and real wages across age groups. Moreover, we demonstrate that variation in the
age composition of aggregate hours accounts for a signiﬁcant fraction of the moderation
in U.S. business cycle volatility observed in the past 25 years. These results corroborate
estimates of the role of demographics in the Great Moderation that are derived from our
simple quantitative exercises presented here. In summary, we conclude that demographic
composition constitutes an important propagation mechanism in business cycle analy-
sis, and an important factor in understanding the evolution of postwar business cycle
volatility.
A. Data Sources
U.S. Hours worked: 1963 - 2005, March CPS, Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census
Bureau. Employment, labor force, and population: 1963 - 2004, OECD Labour Force
Statistics database (hereafter OECD LFS). Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, and Mini Historical Statistics, U.S. Census
Bureau. Real GDP: 1958 - 2004, FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Japan. Hours worked: 1972 - 2004, Annual Report of the Labour Force Survey (hereafter
ARLFS), Statistics Bureau of Japan. Employment: 1967 - 1971, OECD LFS; 1972
- 2004, ARLFS. Labor force and population: 1963 - 1971, OECD LFS; 1972 - 2004,
ARLFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, Historical Statistics of Japan, Statistics Bureau of
Japan. Real GDP: 1958 - 2004, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce,
Government of Japan.
Canada: Employment: 1976 - 2004, OECD LFS. Labor force and population: 1966 -
1975, special tabulation of Labour Force Survey provided by Statistics Canada; 1976 -
2004, OECD LFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, B.R. Mitchell (2003), International Historical
Statistics: the Americas, 1750-2000, New York : Palgrave Macmillan. Real GDP: 1961 -
2004, CANSIM database.
France: Employment: 1968 - 2004, OECD LFS. Labor force and population: 1965 -
242004, OECD LFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, B.R. Mitchell (2003), International Historical
Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, New York : Palgrave Macmillan (hereafter MITCHELL
E). Real GDP: 1960 - 2002, Stock and Watson (2003), which has been modiﬁed to account
for 1968 strikes.
Germany: Employment, labor force and population: 1970 - 2004, OECD LFS. Birth
rates: 1900 - 1955, MITCHELL E; 1956 - 1989, Federal Statistics Oﬃce, Germany. Real
GDP: 1965 - 2002, Stock and Watson (2003), which has been modiﬁed to account for
1991 reuniﬁcation.
Italy: Employment and labor force: 1983 - 2004, Eurostat database and OECD LFS.
Population: 1983 - 2004, World Population Prospects, United Nations. Birth rates: 1900
- 1989, MITCHELL E. Real GDP: 1978 - 2004, Stock and Watson (2003), and Eurostat
database.
UK: Employment: 1983, special tabulation of Labour Force Survey provided by Oﬃce
for National Statistics, UK; 1984 - 2004, OECD LFS. Labor force and population: 1979 -
1983, special tabulation of Labour Force Survey provided by Oﬃce for National Statistics,
UK; 1984 - 2004, OECD LFS. Birth rates: 1900 - 1989, MITCHELL E. Real GDP: 1974
- 2004, Oﬃce for National Statistics, UK.
For all countries, inﬂation rates constructed from GDP deﬂator data obtained from the
Datastream database, Thomson Financial.
B. Further Demographic Splits of Hours Worked
Here we presents results on the volatility of hours worked in the U.S. by age and education.
Because of the relatively small fraction of 15 - 19 year olds with post-secondary education,
we omit them in the analysis; because of smaller sample sizes, we combine the 60 - 64
and 65+ age groups.
[TABLE 9 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
The next table presents the volatility of hours worked in the U.S. by age and gender.
Again, because of smaller sample sizes, we combine the 60 - 64 and 65+ age groups.
[TABLE 10 GOES ABOUT HERE.]
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2815 ‐ 19 20 ‐ 24 25 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60 ‐ 64 65+
filtered 
volatility
4.351 2.130 1.471 1.073 0.790 0.824 1.309 2.839
R
2 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.72 0.30 0.22
cyclical 
volatility
3.868 1.902 1.318 1.014 0.752 0.705 0.708 1.331
% of hours 3.24 10.33 12.86 25.38 23.29 17.20 4.82 2.88
% of hours 
volatility
11.22 17.58 15.17 23.03 15.67 10.86 3.05 3.43
15 ‐ 19 20 ‐ 24 25 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60 ‐ 64 65+
filtered 
volatility
2.651 0.936 0.780 0.695 0.580 0.606 0.943 1.084
R
2 0.64 0.64 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.42 0.54
cyclical 
volatility
2.142 0.745 0.727 0.658 0.551 0.586 0.605 0.792
% of hours 2.21 10.18 11.77 23.34 24.19 18.67 4.92 4.73
% of hours 
volatility




Notes: HP filtered data from the Annual Report of the Labour Force Survey, 1972 ‐ 2004.15 ‐ 19 20 ‐ 24 25 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60 ‐ 64
cyclical 
volatility
4.783 2.678 1.791 1.456 1.000 1.067 0.897
U.S. % of employment 6.72 12.30 12.89 24.82 22.27 16.38 4.62
% of employment 
volatility 19.10 19.59 13.73 21.48 13.24 10.39 2.46
cyclical 
volatility
6.793 1.433 1.264 1.100 1.000 1.307 2.645
Japan
A % of employment 2.91 10.77 11.45 22.75 23.22 17.96 10.93
% of employment 
volatility 13.15 10.27 9.63 16.64 15.45 15.62 19.23
cyclical 
volatility
4.147 2.310 1.648 1.289 1.000 0.888 1.262
Canada % of employment 7.46 12.37 13.53 26.61 22.41 14.34 3.29
% of employment 
volatility 19.90 18.39 14.35 22.08 14.42 8.19 2.67
cyclical 
volatility
8.272 6.368 2.784 1.658 1.000 1.711 4.095
France % of employment 2.75 10.36 13.70 27.27 25.21 17.49 3.21
% of employment 
volatility 9.46 27.45 15.87 18.82 10.49 12.45 5.47
cyclical 
volatility
3.073 3.276 2.454 1.577 1.000 1.226 6.692
Germany % of employment 7.82 12.66 11.96 24.57 23.48 16.27 3.25
% of employment 
volatility 12.08 20.87 14.77 19.50 11.81 10.03 10.93
cyclical 
volatility
6.300 3.878 2.023 1.166 1.000 2.422 3.455
Italy % of employment 7.70 8.41 12.45 28.05 24.43 15.94 3.02
% of employment 
volatility 22.84 15.35 11.85 15.39 11.50 18.17 4.91
cyclical 
volatility
5.268 3.346 2.109 1.667 1.000 1.549 2.426
U.K.
B % of employment 6.54 10.90 12.37 25.28 23.51 17.37 4.03
% of employment 




HP FD FQ BP(hi) BP(lo) CG SW







(1.134) (0.690) (2.119) (0.697) (1.090) (3.644) (1.177)
Nobs   207 207 207 180 180 207 207
123456
OLS IV1 IV2 BP OLS IV2
A. annual, HP







(1.134) (1.424) (1.138) (1.203) (1.095) (1.089)
B. annual, SW







(1.177) (1.348) (1.185) (1.248) (1.116) (1.179)
Nobs   207 207 207 207 203 203
C. 4‐year, HP







(1.427) (1.987) (1.422) (1.596) (1.390) (1.379)
D. 4‐year, SW







(1.660) (1.845) (1.678) (1.835) (1.613) (1.608)








endogeneity Blanchard‐Simon15 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60 ‐ 64 Nobs




n/a (1.672) (1.489) (2.086) (4.371)




n/a (1.680) (1.485) (2.165) (4.448)




n/a (1.676) (1.500) (2.077) (4.406)
4 BP 0 –2.745 –4.335
כככ –6.769
כככ –0.614 207
n/a (1.739) (1.674) (2.520) (4.658)
15 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60 ‐ 64 Nobs




n/a (1.714) (1.548) (1.663) (4.053)
2 IV1 0 –3.045
כ –4.289
כככ –3.078 –3.032 207
n/a (1.714) (1.533) (1.940) (4.239)
3 IV2 0 –2.949
כ –4.027
כככ –2.787 –3.811 207
n/a (1.743) (1.570) (1.881) (4.166)
4 BP 0 –2.913 –4.319
ככ –3.506 –3.689 207









Volatile‐Aged 15 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60 ‐ 64
















1.411 2.362 1.942 1.574 1.061 1.172 1.852
more than 
high school




1.380 2.106 1.739 1.467 0.920 0.894 1.009
more than 
high school
0.705 1.694 1.026 0.532 0.526 0.331 0.616
15+ 15 ‐ 19 20 ‐ 24 25 ‐ 29 30 ‐ 39 40 ‐ 49 50 ‐ 59 60+
filtered vol.
female 1.083 4.865 2.067 1.594 1.141 0.955 1.034 2.152
male 1.185 4.664 2.744 1.645 1.257 0.854 0.891 1.647
cyclical vol.
female 1.052 4.087 1.726 1.183 0.872 0.776 0.706 0.936
















































































































































































































































































































































1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
s
h
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
year
D:  Italy